Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

David R. Daines, Trustee of the Verna Daines Trust
v. Logan City : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jody K. Burnett; Robert W. Keller; Williams and Hunt; Kymber D. Housely; Attorneys for Appellee.
David R. Daines; Pro Se.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, David R. Daines, Trustee of the Verna Daines Trust v. Logan City, No. 20100997 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2664

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

David R. Daines, Trustee of
the VERNA R. DAINES TRUST,
Plaintiff/ Appellant
Appellate Case No. 20100997-CA
vs.
LOGAN CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation, and John and Jane Does
One to Fifty,
Defendant/ Appellee

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Cache County, Judge Clint S. Judkins
JODY K. BURNETT
ROBERT W. KELLER
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678

DAVID R. DAINES
1158 N. 1750 E.
Logan, UT 84341
Pro Se/Attorney Appellant

And
KYMBER D. HOUSLEY
LOGAN CITY ATTORNEY
290 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84323
Attorneys for Appellee Logan City

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

SEP 2 7 2011

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

David R. Dairies, Trustee of
the VERNA R. DAINES TRUST,
Plaintiff/ Appellant
Appellate Case No. 20100997-CA
vs.
LOGAN CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation, and John and Jane Does
One to Fifty,
Defendant/ Appellee

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Cache County, Judge Clint S. Judkins
JODY K. BURNETT
ROBERT W. KELLER
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678

DAVID R. DAINES
1158N. 1750 E.
Logan, UT 84341
Pro Se/Attorney Appellant

And
KYMBER D. HOUSLEY
LOGAN CITY ATTORNEY
290 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84323
Attorneys for Appellee Logan City

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
REPLY SUMMARY

1

REPLY TO THE CITY'S ARGUMENTS

6

A. CONTRARY TO THE CITY ARGUMENT "I", THE AE CODE
APPLIES TO ALL LEVELS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
PROCESS ON ALL ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS INCLUDING THE
TRUST'S NONCONFORMING RIGHTS DEFENSE TO THE SINGLE
FAMILY ZONE VIOLATION CHARGE

6

1) "May" Gives Choices (1) To Enforce (2) By Admin, or Crim. Means:
2) City's "May" Interpretation Fails On Other Constitutional Grounds:
3) The City Ignores The Rule That Legislative Intent Is Determinative:
4) Inserting Board In Development Appeals Ch. 17,57 Violates MLUDMA
Et. Al

13

B. THE CITY'S REMAINING POINT "I" ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT
MERIT

14

C. CONTRARY TO THE CITY'S POINT "II" ARGUMENT, THE TRUST
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT, 1) THE LATE RULES
DID NOT APPLY TO THE TRUST APPEAL, AND 2) WERE INVALID ON
THEIR FACE AND WERE A DE FACTO LEGISLATIVE PRETEXT TO
CONTINUE THE DE FACTO BOARD'S ULTRA VIRES PROCEEDINGS

16

D. BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS MARSHALED IN THE
TRUST'S BRIEF, THE AUTHORITIES CITED ARE INAPPOSITE TO THE
CITY'S CLAIM THAT NONCONFORMING RIGHTS ARE NOT
PROTECTABLE PROPERTY INTERESTS FOR PURPOSES OF §1983 DUE
PROCESS CLAIMS

16

E. THE CITY'S ARGUMENT ON EQUAL PROTECTION
MISREPRESENTS THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT SHOW THE
TRUST'S CLAIM IS ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW

18

F. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH THAT THE DIRECTOR'S
DECISION AT ISSUE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AS A
MATTER OF LAW

19

G. ANDERSON V. PROVO MISREPRESENTED: IT SUPPORTS THE
TRUST ARGUMENTS ON TERMINATION POLICY, EQUAL
PROTECTION AND LICENSING

20

H.

21

CAUSATION

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,l may contain errors.

8
10
12

CONCLUSION

22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

24
ADDENDUM

Record of six cases before the AE Code Hearing Examiner

Exhibit 1

Article: Utah Bar Journal, February 1990, Commissioner's
Report, "Being a Lawyer is Not For Everyone" by Jackson
B.Howard

Exhibit 2

Provo City Code Ch. 14.30 S-Supplementary Residential
Overlay Zone ordinance

Exhibit 3

Provo City Code Ch. 6.26 Rental Dwellings, landlord
licensing ordinance

Exhibit 4

i

(

(

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Anderson v. Provo City 2005 UT 5

4,20

Heldaman v. Washington City, 2007 UTApp 11

17

La Salle National Bank v. Cook County (1957), 12111. 2d 40, 145N.E. 2d 65

22

Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7

17

Willowbrookv. Olech, 528 U.S. 562

18

STATUTES
Utah Code § 10-9a-701(l)

14

LOGAN CITY ORDINANCES
AE Code LDC § 17.60. 220 F
AE Code LDC § 17.60.130
LDC§ 17.57.030

15
9,10
5

LDC Chapter 17.57
LMC§ 5.17.050 C

6, 13
20

TREATISES
73 Am Jur 2d Statutes § 265 (1974 ed. unchanged in 2001 supplement)

10

73 Am Jur 2d Statutes §145 (1974 ed. unchanged in the 2001 supplement)

12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
iii may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

David R. Daines, Trustee of
the VERNA R. DAINES TRUST,
Plaintiff/Appellant
Appellate Case No. 20100997-CA
vs.
LOGAN CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation, and John and Jane Does
One to Fifty,
Defendant/ Appellee

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

REPLY SUMMARY
The most notable feature of the Brief of the Appellee ("City Br.'5) is the
conspicuous absence of arguments countering the Trust briefs major points, authorities
and arguments that show a broad and systemic pattern of disregard of the rule of
constitutional law in City governance. The Trust submits that the failure of the City to
counter those arguments is a concession of their validity, especially where the City had
ten unused brief pages on which to counter those arguments and failed to do so.
The City's summary of its argument and argument ignore the Trust briefs broad
unchallenged civil rights points, and narrows and defines the scope of its response:
Daines appeal depends primarily on varied assertions that his
nonconforming use claim should have been decided by a Hearing Examiner under
the City's Administrative Enforcement Code, and because the City instead
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directed his appeal to the Board, that body's decision was arbitrary, capricious and
illegal and violated Dames' constitutional rights.
This apparently major component of Daines' appeal fails quite simply
because by its own plain terms the Administrative Enforcement Code is
permissive, rather than mandatory, enforcement mechanism. No City ordinance
appoints a Hearing Examiner as an appeal authority over any land use decision,
but city ordinances do unambiguously appoint the Board as the authority to which
an appeal of a nonconforming use decision must be made. Indeed, there is no
"violation" of City ordinances a Hearing Examiner could address until after the
Board makes a final decision on a responsible person's claim of a nonconforming
use. City Br. p 20.
The Trust will show that this City interpretation of the relevant ordinances is
without merit, that the AE Code scope clause use of "may" rather than "shall" does not
permit the City to choose whether it will opt out of the AE Code or direct appeals from
decisions to the Board or Hearing Examiner. An interpretation of the AE Code that the
Board had sole or "permissive" appellate authority would be an unconstitutional
interpretation and violate MLUDMA. The AE Code-Land Development Code
"ordinance" appoints the Hearing Examiner as the appeal authority over all City nonlegislative administrative decisions and pre-empts the Board's previous appellate
authority over those decisions. The assertion that nonconforming use right claims are
subject to onerous double appeal processes that do not apply to other similar rights is
disingenuous.
The City summarizes its next argument as follows:
To the extent that they are cognizable, Daines' secondary arguments similarly fail.
The Board enacted the bylaws and rules required by ordinance prior to hearing or
deciding Daines' appeal, and Daines does not demonstrate the bylaws were noncompliant in any way. The Board and district court review provided Daines with
ample procedural due process, and the Board's decision is well supported by
evidence in the record and a rational basis, and so is not arbitrary or capricious in
any way. City Br. pp 20-21.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In reply, the Trust will show not only that the de facto Board acted beyond its
jurisdiction but also acted without authority because it failed to adopt the ordinance
required rules of procedure for a quasi-judicial body, that the invalid Robert's Rules of
legislative order adopted after a decade of unauthorized ad hoc ultra vires actions were a
pretext to continue its future ultra vires operation; and did not, could not and were not
intended by the Board to apply to the Trust appeal. The de facto Board ignored the due
process rules in the AE Code on the pretext that legislative rules provided due process.
There is no merit to the City's claim that the de facto Board or district court provided
required procedural due process and the de facto Board's actions were per se arbitrary
and capricious.
The City asserts in the conclusion to its summary of arguments:
Daines' remaining vaguely defined claims that an administrative search violated
the Fourth Amendment and the City's Landlord Licensing ordinance is
unconstitutional, were not plead in the operative complaint nor presented to the
district court. This Court should not now address them on appeal. City Br. p 21.
Conspicuously absent from the City's brief is its failure to respond to the Trust's
primary claim that the administrative search violated the AE Code requirement that there
must be consent or an administrative warrant and was therefore per se arbitrary, thus

'

violating due process. The concurrent Fourth Amendment connection is obvious and
intertwined with the due process implications. The consideration of the dual legal
consequences flowing from the same facts is essential to a proper judicial resolution of
the issues.
(
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The reason the City's Landlord Licensing ordinance was not and could not have
been plead in the operative complaint nor presented in the district court is that it did not
take effect until July 1, 2010 after all the summary judgment pleadings were complete.
The Trust would have been remiss in its duty to the court in this appeal to have failed to
add this issue in the same sense that there is a due diligence duty to research and bring to
the attention of the court later cases that bear on the issues on appeal.
The last two paragraphs of the City Brief respond to the Trust claim that the City's
Landlord Licensing ordinance is unconstitutional:
Although the basis for Daines' challenge to the City's Landlord Licensing
Ordinance are also unclear, he does describe the ordinance as a "Provo style
landlord licensing ordinance." Aplt's. Br. p. 46. In Anderson v. Provo City. 2005
UT 5, the Utah Supreme Court denied a challenge to Provo City's Landlord
Licensing Ordinance and held that the Provo ordinance and associated
amendments "constitute land use regulations within the zoning power of the Provo
City Municipal Council. Anderson 2005 UT 5, ^J 16. The Court went on to hold
that the Ordinance "does not violate owners, constitutional rights to the uniform
operation of laws, to equal protection, or to travel, and is not an invalid restraint on
alienation." Id TI 29.
Except for opprobrious characterizations of the policy underlying the ordinance,
Daines fails to allege or prove the ordinance has ever been applied to him. Aplt's.
Br. pp. 46-48. In light of Anderson v. Provo, and absent any citation to authority
or analysis, Daines' challenge to the City's Landlord Licensing Ordinance fails
even if the Court were inclined to address it. City Br. p 39
The Trust will show that: (1) Anderson has nothing to do with Provo's Landlord
Licensing ordinance; (2) it was the City not the Trustee who in 2006 described a future
"Provo style landlord licensing ordinance" as an additional means of enforcing Logan's
nonconforming rights termination policy; (3) an analysis of the differences between the
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Provo pattern and the Logan ordinance identifies many of the unconstitutional effects of
the Logan ordinance not present in the Provo pattern.
An analysis of 2005 Anderson shows (1) it deals exclusively with an amendment
to a zoning ordinance not the landlord licensing ordinance; (2) that the "return to single
family character of neighborhoods" justification terminology for Logan's 2006 policy
terminating legal non conforming rights was borrowed directly from and is inapposite to
the Anderson opinion and holding; (3) the Anderson opinion supports the Trust argument
that (a) the licensing ordinance provision that exempts owners who occupy one of the
multi-family units from licensing and forced grandfathering, denies equal protection to
the class of non occupying owners, (b) that the general policy of terminating legal
nonconforming rights denies equal protection to the class of non conforming rights as
distinct from other similar property rights protected by zoning laws.
All of the City's arguments are without merit, basically contradictory and often in
denial of uncontested facts and law presented in the Trust brief that the City elected not to
challenge. One example: The City argues that the Board is a "permissive" alternative to
the Hearing Examiner as a quasi-judicial appeal body from administrative decisions
because it is so designated in the table, LDC § 17.57.030. City Br. p 26, Table p 13. This
assumes that the Board's quasi-judicial appeals jurisdiction was legally inserted along
with "Board of Appeals" development related action appellate jurisdiction into this table
and other sections of Chapter 17.57. In making this argument the City disingenuously
ignores the Trust's arguments that the inclusion of the Boards quasi-judicial appeal
jurisdiction in that chapter was illegal because its scope is expressly limited to appeals on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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legislative "land development actions" of the City inapposite to a quasi-judicial appeal
body. Trust Br. pp 31-32, 36-39, T pp 6-11. Other examples are; (1) the City assumes the
de facto Board acts as a quasi-judicial body providing due process without disputing the
Trust's facts and arguments that it operated ad hoc and later by rules under legislative
Robert's Rules of Order and LDC Chapter 17.57, expressly limited to appeals on
legislative "land development actions"; (2) the City leaves undisputed the Trust facts and
arguments that the City was enforcing a new policy of terminating legal nonconforming
rights on the grounds it was "restoring"-"preserving" the single family character of
predominantly multi-family neighborhoods; (3) the City claims the right to choose which
of two appeals entities (Board or Hearing Examiner) it will direct any given
administrative appeal to; (4) on the one hand the City claims that the Trust appeal would
have been ripe for appeal to the Hearing Examiner after the Board decision and on the
other hand that it was of a peculiar type over which the Board had exclusive and final
jurisdiction. These and other evasions and contradictions will be addressed in the
argument.
The meritless, contradictory and evasive arguments in the City's short brief,
compared with the undisputed facts and law presented in the Trust's full length brief is an
example of a local governance system that disregards the rule of constitutional law.
REPLY TO THE CITY'S ARGUMENTS
A.

CONTRARY TO THE CITY ARGUMENT "I", THE AE CODE APPLIES
TO ALL LEVELS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
PROCESS ON ALL ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS INCLUDING THE
TRUST'S NONCONFORMING RIGHTS DEFENSE TO THE SINGLE
FAMILY ZONE VIOLATION CHARGE.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Based on undisputed facts, the Trust's first argument is that a correct interpretation
of the AE Code is that it applies not only to quasi-judicial appeals but also to all levels of
the administrative enforcement of all City ordnance violations including zoning and
single family zone enforcement as in this case. The Trust's initial focus was on the claim
that the City should have directed the appeal to the Hearing Examiner under the AE Code
rather than to the Board. The Trust supported this argument with case citations on general
rules of interpretation including plain meaning, history and intended purpose with
relevant quotes from Council minutes and the AE Code. Trust Br. pp 27-30. Those
arguments are incorporated herein by this reference.
The foundation of the City's arguments is based on an interpretation of the AE
Code scope clause that it makes the code a "permissive rather than mandatory
enforcement mechanism" because it states, "The provisions of this Title may be applied
to all violations of the Logan Municipal Code...", (emphasis supplied) T 6 p 1. Trust Br.
p 27, City Br. p 24. The City argues that it was thereby "permitted" not only to direct this
and all similar appeals to the alternative Board forum but also to disregard the code at all
stages of administrative enforcement. The City argues that it could also have elected to
direct these appeals to the Hearing Examiner under the AE Code. This is the pretext the
City uses to disregard the Trust's arguments regarding the interpretation and application
of the AE Code throughout the enforcement process. City Br. pp 20-27.
Additionally, to follow the City's argument that the use of "may" allows for two
methods of settling disputes, where one of those methods is unconstitutional is irrational
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and renders the In addition to the City's interpretation without merit for the following
reasons:
1)

"May" Gives Choices (1) To Enforce (2) By Admin, or Crim. Means:

The scope clause use of "may" gives the City the choice of enforcing or not enforcing.
Then, if it chooses to enforce, it "may" also elect administrative or criminal enforcement.
It does not give the City the right to enforce outside the AE Code, or, the City or litigants
the right to choose between two appeal forums as the City claims.
An obvious and compelling reason "may (not "shall") be applied to all violations "
is used, is inherent in the principle of the separation of powers. The legislature/council
has the power to make the code law and the executive/mayor has the power to enforce the
code law. The legislature/council cannot take away the mayor/executive's discretion
about which violations of its code laws the mayor will enforce and compel the mayor to
enforce all violations of its code laws sometimes called "prosecutorial discretion". Had
the council used the words and phrase "shall be applied to all violations", the code law
would have violated that most fundamental separation principle of constitutional
governance.
This voluminous record is a powerful example of the application of this principle
of executive enforcement discretion (may versus shall) at the core of the separation of
powers. The current mayor's administration has concluded that over 50% of the
dwellings in the 1950 city violate the single-family zone code provisions. A code
provision requiring that the administration "shall" apply/enforce all (including 50%) code
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violations would not only violate the separation of powers principle, it would also be
absurd and irrational on many levels.
The City argument that "may" should be interpreted to "permit" the City or
litigants to opt out of Code enforcement or pick and choose which of two administrative
appeal entities a particular case should be assigned to is absurd, irrational and
unconstitutional, especially where one provides due process to the litigants and the other
does not.
The plain meaning of AE Code LDC § 17.60.130 (quoted in City Br. p 24)
establishes with certainty that "may" as used there and in the scope clause confirms the
separation of powers discretion of the administration to choose; "may undertake any of
the procedures herein". It is also expressed by the City Attorney in the legislative history
that the criminal enforcement was also a "may" option. That section also expressly
provides that if the administration does choose to administratively enforce, all levels of
the enforcement process are subject "to the provisions of this Title (the AE Code)". The
City has denied this sweeping application of the AE Code to the entire elective
enforcement process. It ends with its grant of power "to use any remedy available under
this Title (AE Code)". There is an open question as to whether or not, and to what extent,
the AE Code may apply when the city elects to enforce through criminal proceedings.
Because this section has such a profound effect in resolving many issues raised by the
City and resolves critical arguments it failed to counter, it is quoted in full with emphasis
supplied.
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General Enforcement Authority:
Whenever an administrative official finds that a violation of the Logan Municipal
Code or applicable state codes has occurred or continues to exist, he may
undertake any of the procedures herein. The director or any designated
enforcement official shall have the authority to gain compliance with the
provisions of the Logan Municipal Code and applicable state codes subject to the
provisions of this Title. Such authority shall include the power to issue notices of
violation and administrative citations, inspect public and private property, abate
nuisances on public and private property, and to use any remedy available under
this Title or law. (emphasis supplied) AE Code LDC § 17.60.130, T 6 p 3
The City, after making it's foundation argument that "may" gives it the discretion
to disregard the AE Code in administrative enforcement proceedings and permission to
elect forums, states: "Applying these principles here, the plain and unambiguous terms of
the Administrative Enforcement Code make its application to any proceeding concerning
a violation permissive, rather than mandatory". City Br. p 26. The correct "plain and
unambiguous" meaning is this - if the City elects to enforce and enforce with
administrative rather than criminal enforcement it cannot then elect to disregard the AE
Code as it has done and claims the right to do. At a minimum degree of credibility, the
City's foundation argument is without merit and its dependent arguments thus fail.
2)

City's "May" Interpretation Fails On Other Constitutional Grounds:

There are additional ways in which the City's interpretation contradicts a rational
construction rule that provides a more comprehensive view of the systemic breakdown
evident in the extensive undisputed record in this case:
A statute subject to interpretation is presumed not to have been intended to
produce absurd consequences, but to have the most reasonable operation that its
language permits. If possible, doubtful provisions should be given a reasonable,
rational, sensible and intelligent construction. 73 Am Jur 2d Statutes § 265 (1974
ed. unchanged in 2001 supplement).
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It is irrational etc. to give a city the unfettered discretion to enforce ordinances
without applying the AE Code. The absurdity is only compounded by also giving the City
the option to choose which of two quasi-judicial appellate bodies will hear the appeal,
even if both quasi-judicial forums in fact provided due process to the litigants. The
irrationality is further multiplied in this case where it is undisputed that the optional de
facto lay Board of five operates under legislative Robert's Rules of Order inapposite to
AE Code due process Hearing Examiner (law school graduate) forum option provides
detailed expanded due process protections to litigants. The City has not disputed the
Trust's facts and arguments shown in the following table (herein Table 1).
No Due Process Rights in Board
of Adjustment Proceedings T 5 pp 4-5

|
AE Code Due Process Rights in
| Hearing Examiner Proceedings T 6

i
Right of Litigants to Notice of Due Process Procedural Rules
None (only late Robert's legislative rules) | §... 180
Right to Cross Examine Sworn Adverse Witnesses
None
| §...230 D.
Right to Present Sworn-Affidavit Proof Testimony at Hearing
None
| §...230 D
Right to Present Telephonic-Electronic Sworn Proof
None
| §...230 D
Right to Subpoena Witnesses, Documents and Other Evidence
None
| §...220 C
Informal Exchange of Discovery May be Required
None
| §...230 A
Judicial Body-Judge Without a Personal or Financial Interest
None
| §...210 B.l.
City Has Burden to Prove Illegality (undisputed, Trust Br. pp 33-34)
Burden to Prove Legality on Owner
| §...230 B.,C.
Right to Establish Grounds for a New Hearing
None
| §...230 D.
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Many pivotal City arguments are in denial of the de facto Board's pervasive disregard for
due process in both its pre 2007 ad hoc proceedings and its post 2007 invalid legislative
rules proceedings. This systemic pattern of due process denial was argued by the Trust
and never challenged by the City. It is disingenuous for the City to repeatedly assume in
its determinative arguments that the de facto (quasi-judicial?) Board's proceedings
provide due process without countering the Trust's arguments to the contrary. Trust Br.
pp 36-40.
3)

The City Ignores The Rule That Legislative Intent Is Determinative:

Threaded through the City arguments are claims that the AE Code was only intended as
an alternative administrative remedy to the Board of Adjustment and that nonconforming
rights determinations were not covered. These claims are in denial and disregard of the
undisputed facts and Trust arguments that the Council, in adopting the AE Code,
expressly intended that the AE Code was the sole administrative enforcement process for
all ordinance violations and particularly for grandfathering and other occupancy capacity
questions. Trust Br. pp 28-29.
In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is the all-important and
controlling factor. Indeed it is frequently stated in effect that the intention of the
legislature constitutes the law. Accordingly, the primary rule of construction of
statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention of the legislature, and to carry such
intention into effect, to the fullest degree. A construction adopted should not be
such as to nullify, destroy, or defeat the intention of the legislature. 73 Am Jur 2d
Statutes §145 (1974 ed. unchanged in the 2001 supplement)
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4)

Inserting Board In Development Appeals Ch.17,57 Violates MLUDMA Et Al.

In order to rationalize the existence of the Board as a legally viable option to the AE
Code Hearing Examiner, the City argued that the quasi-judicial Board's "bare bones"
1997 organic ordinance was "fleshed out" by the Board's insertion into LDC Chapter
17.57. City Br. 26. Conspicuously absent from its argument was the uncontested fact that
the scope of that chapter provided "appeals procedures for development related actions of
the City", not for appeal procedures for quasi-judicial due process appeals as required by
MLUDMA and due process. City Br. p 26. All the other appeal entities included were in
the legislative development business, not dispensing quasi-judicial due process. It is
alarming that the Director who's decisions are appealed "shall prepare administrative
procedures" (also missing) for the Board in the Chapter and the Board is required to
prepare its own administrative procedures under the 1997 ordinance. The erroneous
inclusion of the de jure quasi-judicial, but de facto legislative Board is appalling from a
due diligence perspective and is another example of an irrational, confusing and
conflicting system that defies the rule of law. The City never challenged the Trust's
arguments on this point. Trust Br. pp 31-32. This anomaly apparently originated with the
1997 Ordinance from a lack of understanding the fundamental difference between the
extant development entities and the City's first quasi-judicial forum and has never been
corrected. MLUDMA and the AE Code, borrowed almost verbatim from Provo,
apparently failed to alert the City to this cardinal error and may partly explain how the
City got off track regarding due process.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Housley) As far as the due process goes he refers to the lack thereof. Admittedly
we did not have bylaws passed but that is not where the due process rights are
contained...Ordinance and that is contained in Chapter 17 or Title 17 Chapter 57
of our Land Use Code... F 35, R 150(1) p 11.
Housley's repeated claims that specific legislative procedures constituted due
process, quoted in full at F 35, leads to the conclusion that he either misunderstood or
knew better and was addressing the lay Board members, not the Trustee. He had drafted
the AE Code with its expanded due process rights detailed in Table 1. Trust Br. p 29.
B.

THE CITY'S REMAINING POINT «I" ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT
MERIT
The City concludes its Point "I" argument with a description of a confused de

facto administrative enforcement system that by comparative analysis bears little or no
resemblance to its de jure legal system.
On the other hand, no statute or ordinance designates a Hearing Examiner under
the Administrative Enforcement Code as an appeal authority. Based on the
structure of the ordinances, if a "responsible person" claims a nonconforming use
right, that claim must be resolved through the appropriate land use appeal process
before there is even a "violation" a Hearing Examiner could address. Only if
Daines were to continue to use his dwelling as three units in violation of the
Board's decision would the Administrative Code and a Hearing Examiner be a
permissive option to be used to enforce what would then be a code violation.
No cites are given to support these claims. The first sentence basis for what
follows appears to deny that the Hearing Examiner under the AE Code is an ordinance
established quasi-judicial "appeal authority to hear and decide.. .appeals from decisions
applying the land use ordinances" as required by Utah Code § 10-9a-701(l). The Council
and City Attorney insisted that the code was intended primarily to enforce land use
violations including grandfathering, covered all ordinance violations and was included in
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the Land Development Code. Trust Brief p 26, T pp 25-26. The next sentence appears to
be taken out of context from the AE Code LDC § 17.60. 220 F, phrase "if a person claims
a nonconforming right" and then distorts its meaning by (1) omitting "as a defense" after
"right" and; (2) substituting "appeals" for "determinations of the existence of
nonconforming rights". Trust Br. p 30. Even if this distorted sentence is taken at face
value, the last sentence that gives the City the "permissive option" after Board appeal to
opt back to the AE Code Hearing Examiner to enforce the Board decision makes no
sense. Even if that is the case, the provision would clearly deny nonconforming rights due
process by the Board and equal protection given other similar rights not subject to those
proceedings. Ironically this argument assumes first that the Hearing Examiner is not an
appeal authority, then switches to the assumption he is and that the code applies to all
appeals, treats nonconforming rights appeals differently, then all other appeals continue
through the Hearing Examiner with ultimate enforcement power in all cases electively in
the Hearing Examiner. This argument is not only irrational but also disingenuous because
the City failed to counter the Trust brief argument points and authorities on the effect of
the above cited unique nonconforming rights as a defense section of the AE Code under
three subtopics, A. 4, A. 5 and A. 6. Trust Br. pp 30-31.
This claimed right of the City (or litigant) to select whether an appeal will go to a
legally trained Hearing Examiner dispensing due process or a to a lay Board of five who
operate under Robert's Rules of Order is unconstitutional on its face. Table 1. The record
in this case establishes how the application of'thepermissive forum selection process has
resulted in a corrupt system, whether or not so intended.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Pursuant to a GRAMA request in February 2011 the City delivered to the Trustee
copies of all Requests for Administrative Hearings and Determinations of the Hearing
Examiner from the inception of the AE Code. They are "Exhibit # 1" pp 1-23. There are
six total cases abstracted on page "A". Four are represented by lawyers. They include
land use, park strip, nonconforming use control, over occupancy and signage violations.
In a Council meeting on August 18, 2009: "Attorney Housley said staff decisions could
be appealed to the Board, i.e., parking permits or on-site solutions." T 10 p 14.
C.

CONTRARY TO THE CITY'S POINT "II" ARGUMENT, THE TRUST
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT, 1) THE LATE RULES
DID NOT APPLY TO THE TRUST APPEAL, AND 2) WERE INVALID
ON THEIR FACE AND WERE A DE FACTO LEGISLATIVE PRETEXT
TO CONTINUE THE DE FACTO BOARD'S ULTRA VIRES
PROCEEDINGS.
In Point II of its argument, the City (pp 27-29) carved out a very narrow challenge

to the Trust's broad § 1983 claim that the de facto Board acted in a pattern disregarding
the rule of constitutional law based on arguments in the Trust Br. pp 36-40. The City
narrows its challenge to a named few of the Trust's claims which it calls
"characterizations" and adds: "However these characterizations are wholly unsupported
by any citation to applicable authority of the Board's bylaws and rules." Those claims
and all the related broader claims the City does not challenge are based on undisputed
facts and established as a matter of law with applicable authority. Trust Br. pp 36-40.
D.

BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS MARSHALED IN THE TRUST'S
BRIEF, THE AUTHORITIES CITED ARE INAPPOSITE TO THE CITY'S
CLAIM THAT NONCONFORMING RIGHTS ARE NOT PROTECTABLE
PROPERTY INTERESTS FOR PURPOSES OF §1983 DUE PROCESS
CLAIMS.
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Under Point "IIP the City argues that the Trust's due process claims fail as a
matter of law, (1) because a nonconforming right is not a protectable property interest;
(2) because the Board provided the procedural due process protections required by the
circumstances, and; (3) because the Director's denial was not arbitrary, capricious, or
without a rational basis. City Br. pp 29-31
The two cases the City cites challenging a nonconforming property right as a
protectable property interest in fact are powerful authority supporting nonconforming
rights as protectable property interests. Under Heldaman v. Washington City, 2007 UT
App 11 a nonconforming right qualifies as "an interest in which one has a legitimate
claim of entitlement. It is not an abstract need for, or a unilateral expectation of, a benefit.
Rather, it is a right of a particular decision reached by applying the facts". Under
Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, a nonconforming right is not a claim of
entitlement to a favorable land use decision from a legislative planning and zoning board,
but rather is a right to a decision reached by a quasi-judicial forum applying rules to facts
under Heldaman. City Br. pp 29-30.
Under the cases cited in City Br. p 30 on procedural due process, it may have
required an analysis of the circumstances to determine whether the Board provided
procedural due process from 1997 to the 2004 AE Code, because there was no city
ordinance that provided due process rules. On the adoption of the AE Code with its
expanded due process requirements, the de facto Board that had no due process rules was
and is required to provide the same due process protections provided in the Code. In
exercising its remaining quasi-judicial original jurisdiction over variances, the Board is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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required to follow those rules under this doctrine and MLUDMA. The 1997 Ordinance
also requires that in variances AE Code due process rules must replace its invalid
legislative rules.
The City's argument on page 31 regarding the Trust's substantive due process
claim is included in the City's Point "IV". The Trust's reply to that point will cover that
subject,
E.

THE CITY'S ARGUMENT ON EQUAL PROTECTION
MISREPRESENTS THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT SHOW THE
TRUST'S CLAIM IS ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW
The City argues that the Trust's uclass of one" discriminatory enforcement claim

fails. City Br. pp 32-35. This whole argument is based on an unconscionable
misrepresentation and denial of the relevant record facts that the City expressly "does not
dispute". City Br. p 7. The undisputed "class of one" facts were marshaled in F 12 pp 1213 and in the "D. Trust: Class-of-One & Civil Rights Retaliation Victim" argument in the
Trust's brief. Trust Br. pp 40-43. When the authorities cited by the City are applied to the
marshaled facts that the City does not dispute, they show that the Trust has established its
"class of one" discriminatory enforcement claim as a matter of law. The City
misrepresents and omits from its "characterization", the undisputed facts that establish
the Trust's claim as a matter of law.
To establish that the City's decision could constitute some sort of equal
protection violation, Daines relies upon the "class of one" rationale described in
Willowbrook v. Olecbu 528 U.S. 562...Daines characterizes the City's request that
he apply for a grandfathering exemption as retaliation for his accusation that the
City had attempted to "extort" a gift of street frontage and as "targeting] this
beautiful home." These arguments fail for several reasons.
City Br. p 32.
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False: "City's request that he apply for a grandfathering exemption". Undisputed
fact: "The initiation of single-family zone violation charge in the Compliance Request
Letter preceded by a warrant-less search resulted...". Trust Br. p 40. False grounds:
"accusations that the City had attempted to "extort" a gift of street frontage and as
"target(ing) this beautiful home". The core omitted undisputed facts and other related
undisputed facts that establish the claim as a matter of law are; "Multi-family neighbors
on both sides were similarly situated, did not accuse the City of attempted gift extortion
and have not been charged with single family zone violations". Trust Br. p 41.
These undisputed facts qualify the Trust's claim under all the authorities cited in
both briefs.
F.

THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH THAT THE DIRECTOR'S
DECISION AT ISSUE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
The City's argument for denying the Trust's claim that the Director's denial of its

grandfathering claim was arbitrary/capricious is based on the City's claim that the Trust
has not met the burden of proof and failed to "marshal the evidence" as required. City Br.
pp 35-37. The record establishes that the Trustee has gone to extraordinary lengths to
research, define and comply with evidence marshaling requirements in this case with
over seventy pages of undisputed facts in the summary judgment pleadings, a large
record and numerous issues within the brief length limits. The marshaling of the facts on
this arbitrary/capricious issue is a good example and will show the Trust has indeed
marshaled and met the burden. The denial of the Trustee's request for 15 more pages
required more fact and argument summarizing in this part. See Trust Br., argument pp
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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44-45, facts fl 21-26 pp 15-18: summary judgment pleading facts, Tabs 1-3 and the
voluminous record as referenced.
G.

ANDERSON V. PROVO MISREPRESENTED: IT SUPPORTS THE
TRUST ARGUMENTS ON TERMINATION POLICY, EQUAL
PROTECTION AND LICENSING.
The City stated that Anderson v. Provo City 2005 UT 5 declared the Provo

landlord licensing ordinance, the pattern for Logan's landlord licensing ordinance,
constitutional This is false. Anderson declared a zoning ordinance amendment
constitutional that required an owner to occupy the primary unit in order to rent the
accessory unit in a zone which had always been zoned single family, because it would
"maintain the single family character of the neighborhood" which had always been
single family. Exhibit 3. Logan borrowed this terminology as a pretext to justify its
nonconforming rights termination policy when Anderson was inapposite to Logan's case
where the zones had always been predominantly multi-family in character and zoned as
such since 1950.
Logan, in declaring its rights termination policy in 2006, stated that a future Provo
style landlord licensing ordinance would be a good way to ratchet up enforcement of its
new policy. The comparison of Logan's 2010 licensing ordinance (T 9) with Provo's
(Exhibit 4) shows the Provo ordinance is missing the provision Logan put in its ordinance
to cany out the council-mayor's policy of terminating nonconforming rights to "return
neighborhoods to their single family character" by forced inspections and forced
grandfathering. See T 9 p 2, LMC § 5.17.050 C. Logan's licensing ordinance has a
provision that exempts from licensing and forced grandfathering, a multi-family dwelling
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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where the owner occupies one of the units. T 9 p 1, LMC § 5.17.030 D. This provision
denies equal protection under Anderson when Logan's versus Provo's different
circumstances are factored in.
H.

CAUSATION
The root cause of the pattern of disregard of the law that has become evident at the

conclusion of the briefing in this case goes far deeper than those who are caught up in
this record. The root cause is a cultural legacy of inordinate trust in local government
officials "to do the right things" that has unwittingly silenced the rule of constitutional
law in local government. This legacy has been insulated from effective judicial review by
the "technique of economic defenses":
"Insurance companies and large corporate litigants have embarked upon the
technique of economic defenses, making the prosecution of a case financially
impossible for most litigants. Injuries of minor value, regardless of how deserving,
cannot be addressed because of the cost involved."
Utah Bar Journal, February 1990, Commissioner's Report, "Being a Lawyer is Not
for Everyone", by Jackson B. Howard. Addendum Exhibit 2.
The reality of this technique is factored into very economically efficient local
government "risk management" programs that are far less costly than predetermining
whether proposed legislation and policies comply with law and the constitution, even if
you were able to change the mentality of the culture.
The evidence that this legacy existed before many of those involved were born
appears un the face of the record. Between 1970 and 1997 the City's trusted officials
amended the 1950 original city-wide multi-family zones to single family. Before downzoning, those areas had developed into 50% to 75% multi-family residences in reliance
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on the 1950 zoning. The constitutionality of this down-zoning has never been challenged
in Court.
The landmark case on limitations on zoning power is La Salle National Bank v.
Cook County (1957), 12 111. 2d 40, 145 N.E. 2d 65. The court set fourth five factors in
evaluating the validity of a zoning ordinance. It is the Trustee's opinion that those downzonings were clearly beyond the City's zoning power under that case. It is submitted that
in those down-zonings, as with the policies and legislation in this record, that the trusted
local officials believe they serve the public best by responding to "public clamor" and let
the efficient risk management program take care of the legal technicalities.
It is further submitted that a proper decision from this court could provide
guidelines to start a trend back to an ancient legacy of the rule of constitutional law in
local government. The Trustee is convinced that, with those guidelines, the present Logan
officials are as capable as can be found to lead the way back.
CONCLUSION
The Conclusions on page 49 of the Trusts brief are incorporated herein.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED September 2 ^ l 0 1 1 .

/ ^KT^X^\
Da^K.^ames
Pro Se/Attorney Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
7th

On September 27 , 2011,1 hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Appellant to each of the following:

Jody K. Burnett
Robert W. Keller
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
And
Kymber D. Housley
Logan City Attorney
290 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84323

Pro Se/Attorney Appellant
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ABSTRACT OF LOGAN CITY
AE CODE HEARING EXAMINER CASES

The cases are in the order they appear in the answer to the GRAMA request.

Order Date [Name [Pages [Attorney
1. Jan 8 09

Ricks

4-9

2. Sep 20 06

Darley

10-11

H. Olsen

| Subject Notes
Nonconforming use-nuisance
Park strip change

3. Jan 4 07 Skabelund 12-14 G.Skabelund Nuisance-vehicles etc- atty.requests hearing
per Notice of Violation4. Mar 26 07 Robinson 15-19 Z.Froerer
Single-Family over occupancy, 5 v 3
- p. 18 order " that the responsible persons request that the case be
transferred to the Board of Adjustment is DENIED based on record of
Board of Adjustments Dated January 14, 2003".
-p. 19 requests a hearing on the notice of violation.
5. Oct 14 09 Seethaller 20-22 M. Jensen

Shed set back violation

6. Dec 5 08 Nielsen

Temporary sign violation

23
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James Geier
Neighborhood Improvement/CDBG Manager
290 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84321

(435)7169027
David R. Daines
Attorney at Law
1158 North 1750 East
Logan, UT 84341
Dear Attorney Daines:

I have prepared copies of requests for Administrative Hearings and Administrative Enforcement Orders
found in our City records. If you have any other requests and can supply us with any specific names or
cases we will be happy to make them available to you.

Sincerely,

r

~ ^ >

/['

i * •

Pam Collins
Neighborhood Improvement Secretary
Phone n u m b e r : (435) 716-9025
Fax number (435) 716-9001
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Mtornty at law
1158 Iflortf) 1750 -Cast
Xogan Xltafj 84341
Tfcef: 435^753^721 teff 512/8562
January 22,2011
Mayor Randy Watts
Logan City
290 North 100 West
Logan. Utah 84321
Re: Request for City Records
CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Dear Mayor:
This is a request pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 63-2-101 et. seq. as amended to produce
copies of the following Logan City Records within the time required. When I receive telephone
notice at one of the above numbers that those copies are ready.. 1 wil^pay the prescribed copy fees
and receive the record copies;
'"
... ...RECORDS REQUESTED:
1.
' Copies of al 1 Polices and Pf6cedures:ad opted-p^Btt&m.:tA\§ 174fy.104vaf;tl}e.
Administrative Enforcement Code which states:
"The Mayor shall establish policies and procedures for the holding of administrative
enforcement hearings, the appointment of hearing examiners, and. the use of the administrative
procedures herein by enforcement officials."
This request includes a request for the original and all amendments or changes and the
dates of each.
2.
Copies of all "Requests for Administrative Enforcement Hearings11 submitted to
the Community Development Director pursuant to § 17.60.190 B of the Administrative
Enforcement Code.
3.
Copies of all the Determinations of the Hearing Examiner entered pursuant to
§17.60.220 et. seq. Administrative Enforcement Code regarding all Requests for Hearings.
A.
Copies ofttecordjiagsHn all forms and minutes if any of the proceed ngs of the
"joinJ-Avorkshop between the Municipal Council and Planning Commission" held on Thursday
November 9,2006.
If questions arise-concerning this request other than, ad vising: me of timely .compliance. 1
request that they be addressed through E-Mail to me at ^<MLl§5j2(^
Sincerely,,
'''•••

-;

, ^
:f:

V

)

yj9s

;•D.avid RTDai'nes
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Date Rcvd/Initials
Time Received

L@GAN
C I l ^ U N I t t C> UJ i t A..V » C t

GRAMA
REQUEST FORM

CDMMUNHVD:VtiOPMEHI
255 NORTH WAIN STREET, LOGAN, UTAH 84321
PHONE 435.716.9020 FAX 435.716.9001
http//comdev.loganutah.org

Utah Code §63-2-204. Requests - Time limit for response and extraordinary circumstances.
(1) A person making a request for a record shall furnish the governmental entity with a written
request containing:
(a) the person's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number, if available; and
(b) a description of the record requested that identifies the record with reasonable specificity.
A FEE MAY APPLY: $_
Date:

0 -O- !I

Print Name:

ISL/^A y^As

(S^/XA/r^J?^

Email Address:
Mailing Address:

Phone Number:
REQUEST (include property address):

J5JUL/

CKJJ^OU^JAAU^

,

Information/Copies Received By:
Date:

OFFICE USE ONLY: ~

Completed By: /• LtiJbi**
# of Pages Copied 2 [
Date Notified
File Saved As:

Dace: _ A _ _ ± L _ _
Format___
Date Sent

$5.00 x 3-.5~
$ .15 x X\
Total
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH
STIPULATION, FINDINGS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
ORDER

CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT
Enforcement Authority,

Case No

08-250

v.

HEARING EXAMINER: PAUL LARSEN

EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS,
Responsible Persons
Location of Violations80 S HIGHWAY 89/91,
Logan
Violation(s): §17.59.050 A., Nonconforming
Uses, Enlargement and §8.38.020 Refuse/Junk
Vehicles
Tax ID: 03-013-0008/0009

STIPULATION
The parties to this action stipulate to the following Findings and Order.
Dated this _ V _ Day of January 09
JJ-^CXVjCf-

L2

Edward S. Ricks
Responsible Person
^

yY\s^^;t,v^?^4^

Mickey Jen Rioks
Responsible Person

/

tu

^=Sr
(A
Vierm Olsen
Attorney for E-k^ard S. Ricks and Mickey
Jen Ricks .// /,.--..

£r>/L—

)

Lee/Edwards
->
Attorney for City of Logan

FINDINGS
On September 09, 2008, the Planning & Zoning Division with the Department of Community
Development initiated action with Neighborhood Improvement Division, regarding the property
at 3180 S HIGHWAY 89/91, Logan. The responsible persons listed above are doing business
at the above location, known as Ted's Service,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On or about the date of September 10, 2008, there were an estimated one hundred twenty four
vehicles located on the two parcels in question, in addition, to a significant amount of
miscellaneous vehicle parts, tires, weathered lumber, and other refuse. This conflicts with a
judicially approved stipulation of parties in case number 91-0000219 (Cache County, Plaintiff, v.
Edward Scott Ricks and Mickey Jen Ricks, Defendants, dated April 24, 1990)
The current conditions on the properties, constitutes an expansion of the previous legally
existing use, wherein, fifty vehicles may be stored on the property; twenty (in what is referred to
as parcel 2) and thirty (in parcel 1) in respective parcels. In addition, the premises are strewn
with refuse.
A Notice of Violation was served on October 16, 2008 to EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS for
a violation on real property located at 3180 S HIGHWAY 89/91, Logan.
On October 20, 2008, EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS reserved the right of appealing the
Notice of Violation to the Department of Community Development and consequently, an
Administrative Enforcement Hearing was scheduled. After the hearing was scheduled, the
parties reached an agreement and have stipulated to these findings and the following Order:

ORDER
Pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Sections 17.59.050 A., 8.38.020, 17.60.250, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED:
1. that the Notice of Violation to EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS, dated October 16,
2008, is AFFIRMED;
2. that EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS cease from violating the Logan Municipal Code
§ 8.38.020 Refuse/Junk Vehicles; and take any necessary corrective action by February
28, 2009 to correct the above mentioned violation;
3. that EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS cease from violating the Logan Municipal Code
§17.59.050 A., Nonconforming Uses, and take any necessary corrective action, with
respect to the front portion of the property referred to as Parcel 2, corrective action
requires that the responsible persons have no more than twenty vehicles on this parcel
by February 28, 2009 to correct the above mentioned violation. With respect to the rear
portion of the property referred to as Parcel 1, corrective action requires that the
responsible persons have no more than thirty vehicles on this parcel by May 31, 2009 to
correct the above mentioned violation;
4. that a penalty of $50.00 per day will incur every day after February 28, 2008 for any
continuing violations listed in paragraph 2, until the property is brought into compliance
with the Logan Municipal / Land Development Code, with the maximum accrual of
$1,000.00 per violation.
5. that a penalty of $50.00 per day will incur every day after any continuing violations of the
respective dates in paragraph 3, until the property is brought into compliance with the
Logan Municipal / Land Development Code, with the maximum accrual of $1,000.00 per
violation.
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6. that the responsible person(s) allow agents of Logan City to enter the premises and/or
inspect the property with reasonable notice to ensure compliance beginning February
28, 2009, and for one year after the date of compliance.

Dated this ^

Day of January 09

<j^

Larsen
Hearing Examiner
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT

STIPULATION, FINDINGS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
ORDER (MODIFIED)

Enforcement Authority,
Case No

08-250

v.

HEARING EXAMINER: PAUL LARSEN

EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS,
Responsible Persons
Location of Violation:3180 S HIGHWAY 89/91,
Logan
Violation(s): §17.59.050 A., Nonconforming
Uses, Enlargement and §8.38.020 Refuse/Junk
Vehicles
Tax ID: 03-013-0008/0009

STIPULATION
The parties to this action stipulate to modify the findings and order entered into on vJanuary 8,
2009 as follows:
1. The parties agree that the responsible persons may have until June 30, 2009 to
complete the corrective action and have no more than thirty vehicles on the rear portion
of the property referred to as Parcel 1.
2. That the responsible persons will incur a penalty of $50.00 per day for every day after
June 30, 2009, until the property is brought into compliance with the Logan Municipal
Code and Land Development Code, with the maximum accrual of $1,000.00 per
violation if the corrective action referred to in paragraph 1 is not completed by the date
specified.
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3. The parties understand that this extension is being granted due to unforeseen
circumstances and that no further extension will be granted.
All other terms and conditions not referenced above remain in force as set forth in the original
findings and order.
Dated this A

Day of June 09

lerm Olsen
Attorney for Edward S. Ricks and Mickey Jen Ricks
Dated this / $A)ay of June 09
/

+~

^

-^o
l^eafdwards
Attorney for City of Logan
ORDER
Pursuant to the above stipulation, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for compliance may
be extended as set forth in the above stipulation.

Dated this

Day of June 09

"\

..-•^ #
Paul Larsen c—-^
Hearing Examiner
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ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF LOGAN CITY
CACHE COUNTY, UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF

Bruce Parley, Responsible Person
248 East 500 North
Logan, UT 84321

ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT ORDER

ADDRESS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY
248 East 500 North
Logan, UT

Case No. 04-1012
Hearing Examiner-Paul Larsen

Respondent appeared for a hearing on Monday, September 20, 2004, and the following judgment and
order was entered:

FINDING:
The site visit conducted on August 9, 2004, confirmed the City Right-of-Way had been changed
without the written permission of the Director of Public works in violation of Land Development
Code §17.39.140 B.

ORDER:
1. The property owner shall comply by November 1, 2004 to correct the above mentioned violation.
All rock gravel shall be removed from the City Right-of-Way. The park strip shall be relandscaped where the rock gravel was removed in order to prevent parking in the front setback
and in the right-of-way. The owner is responsible to comply and schedule an inspection by the
Department of Community Development, at 716-9025, prior to November 1, 2004.
2. The responsible person shall pay a $95 Hearing Fee by October 20, 2004, to the Department of
Community Development at 255 North Main Street, Logan, Utah 84321.
3. A penalty of $50.00 per day will incur every day after Novemberl, 2004, until the property is
brought into compliance with City Ordinance.

DATED:

~r /

"7"

£L&4

J

'r? %J

/PL^A^,

Paul Larsen
Hearing Examiner
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CITY OF LOGAN UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
255 North Main • Logan, Utah 84321 • 435-716-9025 * Fax 435-716-9001
www.logauutah.org

ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF LOGAN CITY
CACHE COUNTY, UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
D WAYNE SKABELUND, Responsible Person:

ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT ORDER

ADDRESS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY:
305 South 600 West, Logan, Utah

Case No. 06-288
Hearing Examiner - Paul Larsen

Respondent appeared for an Appeal Hearing on, Thursday, January 4, 2007, and the followhag
judgment and order was entered:
RECOMMENDED FINDINGS
Neighborhood Improvement (NI) received a complaint regarding the subject property at
305 Soutli 600 West. On August 29, 2006, Code Compliance Inspector John Lisonbee
conducted a site visit and found miscellaneous refuse (including windows, basketball
standard, etc.). In addition, several unregistered vehicles along with a camper were
parked/located in the property setbacks (yard area). To date the property has not been
brought into compliance.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
1. Remove or properly store the camper outside the setbacks, in addition, to any and
all inoperable vehicles on the property, or if defendant chooses to notwithstanding
any other provision keep up to, but no more than, two (2) inoperable, junked or
unused vehicles on his or her property so long as the vehicles are kept behind a
six foot (6') opaque fence or structure which has the effect of blocking the view of
the vehicles from public or private property; and if fenced a required permit
obtained through Planning & Zoning.
2. The property owner shall come into compliance by immediately discontinuing
parking in the property setbacks and remove all established refuse from the
property by January 19, 2007, pursuant to aforementioned code violations,
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3. The owner is respon^c^u to oon^Jui^ an appumunent witn cue Department of
Coiiuiiunity Development, Neighborhood Improvement, for an inspection at 7169027.
4. If Mr. D. Wayne Skabehmd fails to comply by January 19, 2007 to the corrections
specified herein, the City will immediately assess administrative fines which shall
be $50.00 each day for each separate violation (§17.60380) until the violation iis
corrected.

DATED:

0//0fS/fi

7
Paul Larsen
Hearing Examiner

C^

I certify that the foregoing is a true and correct
copy of an original document filed with the
City of J^ogan, Neighborhood Improvement.

Date 0 4 ^ X 5 , 2 1 0 ' 7
7> W l /

"EXo A ^r\^a^

Secretary of Neighborhood Improvement
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2176 North Main, Ste. 102
North Logan,Utah 84341

(UrBgurrg J&k&bthmb

435-752-9437
FAX 753-0077

Attorney at Law

REQUEST FOR HEARING

\£U |* f t $**
LL

December 11, 2006

Department of Community Development
Neighborhood Improvement/Code Enforcement
255 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321
Case No.:

CE 06-288

Responsible Person:

D. Wayne Skabelund
305 South 600 West
Logan, Utah 84321
(435) 752-6630

Location of Alleged Violation;

305 South 600 West

Tax ID#:

02-030-0017

To Whom It May Concern:
Please be advised that the above-named D. Wayne Skabelund requests a
hearing in accordance with the alleged Notice of Violation, Attorney Gregory Skabelund
will be making an appearance in his behalf. His address and telephone number are
listed above.
Sincer

iregc^y'Skabelunc
Attorney at Law
GS:ab
cc
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH

CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT
/CODE ENFORCEMENT.

ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
ORDER

Case No. 06-09
Enforcement Authority,
v.
GARY L. ROBISON,

HEARING OFFICER: PAUL LARSEN

Responsible Person for property tax
ID: 07-008-0001 with a physical address of
910 North 1200 East, Logan, Utah.
FINDINGS
1.
On January 9, 2006, a complaint was filed with the Department of
Community Development, Neighborhood Improvement Program, regarding the property
at 910 North 1200 East, Logan, Utah. The complainant stated that they don't believe that
the occupancy is only tliree people because there are still 5-7 vehicles on the property and
sometimes parking on the lawn.
2.
On January 26, 2006, Ordinance Enforcement Officer John Lisonbee and
Logan Police Sergeant Barry Parslow spoke with Richard Stock who told them that there
were two or three persons living at this address. After Officer Lisonbee explained that
they knew that more that tliree unrelated individuals lived there, Mr. Stock admitted that
the following five men lived at this address:
Richard Stock with two vehicles, a blue GMC pickup, with a Louisiana license
plate V483244 and a white Honda Accord, with a Louisiana license plate HAA230.
Isaac Byrd with a white Ford pickup, license plate 918NHE, registered with the
address in question.
Wesley Langston with a black Chevy Malibu, license plate UT 1787P registered
with the address in question.
Anthony Lang with a silver Geo Metro, license plate UT 221NLE registered with
the address in question.
3.
On February 17, 2006, Officer Lisonbee spoke with Mr. Robison at the
address in question. Mr. Robison admitted that Jason Swazey, David Stock and Richard
Stock lived at the residence. Mr. Robison stated that Wesley Langston had moved to
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4.
On March 7, 2006, Officer Lisonbee checked the occupancy and found
five living at this home. Officer Lisonbee made contact with the residence. Officer
Lisonbee knocked on the door, a male individual answered. Officer Lisonbee gave the
male individual his card and stated that he was there to find out haw many people lived at
the residence. The male individual inquired how Officer Lisonbee intended to do that.
Officer Lisonbee told the male he was required by ordinance to give his name. The male
individual refused. Officer Lisonbee indicated that he may need to call a police officer
and asked if the male individual lived there. He stated that he didn't. Officer Lisonbee
asked if anyone was there that lived in the home. The male asked Tony if he was there.
Tony was lying on the couch which appeared to be a bed. Officer Lisonbee asked Tony
if he was Tony Lang. He stated that he was. Officer Lisonbee stepped up to the doorstep
so he could see and talk to Tony because the man who answered the door was blocking
the doorway and told Officer Lisonbee he couldn't come into the house. Officer
Lisonbee told the male at the door he was trying to see Tony so they could talk. Officer
Lisonbee told the male individual that since he did not live in the home, he had no
standing and if Tony wished officer Lisonbee not to step in the door step he could ask
him not to. Tony told "Steven" to quit arguing. Officer Lisonbee asked Tony who lived
in the home. Tony told Officer Lisonbee that he, Richard, David, Isaac and Jason lived
there. Officer Lisonbee asked the man who answered the door if he was Steven. He said
yes but refused to give his last name. Officer Lisonbee went out to the car and was
writing some notes when Steven came out and started writing notes himself. Steven got
on his cell phone then went back in the house. He came back out and approached me and
asked for Officer Lisonbee's name. Officer Lisonbee told him that he already gave him
his card. Steven asked for another one and Officer Lisonbee gave him one. Officer
Lisonbee asked if this person was Steven Huber, since a Toyota pickup of his was at the
address. The male individual said that he wasn't Steven Huber. The male individual re
entered the house and officer Lisonbee called to have a police officer meet him at the
address. Officer Lisonbee called dispatch and officer Chad Vernon arrived. Officer
Vernon indicated that he had also been called to this address by David Stock. After
David Stock spoke with Officer Vernon, they both came and spoke with Officer
Lisonbee. David Stock said that only he, his brother Richard and Jason Swazey were
living at the address. Officer Lisonbee informed David Stock that Tony had told him that
he, David Stock, Richard Stock, Isaac Byrd and Jason Swazey lived there. David said
that he did not understand what the problem was and that all of the guys who live at this
address are good guys and make no trouble. Officer Lisonbee told him that they should
have reduced the occupancy and there would be no trouble. David Stock said that he
would not tell me who lived at the house and when I informed that if he lied he could be
arrested. I told him that he did not have to answer any questions. David Stock did tell
Officer Lisonbee that "Steven" is Steven Huber.
5.
On March 7, 2006, after the above exchange took place, Officer Lisonbee
noted that the following vehicles were at the address and appeared not to have been
moved because they each had snow on them and it had snowed during the night:
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a blue GMC pickup, with a Louisiana license plate V483244 registered to Richard
Stock;
a white Honda Accord, with a Louisiana license plate LIAA230 registered to
David Stock;
a white Ford pickup, license plate 918NHE, registered to Isaac C. Byrd;
a silver Geo Metro, license plate UT 221NLE, registered to Anthony Lang;
a Toyota pickup, license plate UT 613 W Z , registered to Steven Huber;
a Toyota Camry, license plate UT 142YEH, registered to Jason Swazey.
6.
On September 4, 2006, Officer Lisonbee and James Geier spoke with
Steven Huber who said that he and the three Stock brothers live in this home. Steven said
that Joseph, Richard and David Stock lived there but refused to give us his last name.
Officer Lisonbee recognized him from an earlier contact when he claimed not to live at
the house.
7.
On October 31, 2006, James Geier spoke with Mr. Robison, they
discussed the occupancy issue and Mr. Robinson made statements that he had three
brothers and another in the residence. Later in the conversation, Mr. Robison stated that
he had two brothers and two others.
8.
A Notice of Violation was served by posting it on the door of the address
in question on February 15, 2007.
9.
That the property owner, Gary L. Robison, has and continues to violate
Logan Municipal Code Section 17.13.050, with regard to occupancy, by allowing more
occupants than pennitted in the Single Family Traditional District. The property owner
has allowed more than one family or more that three unrelated adults.
ORDER
Pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Section 17.60. 250, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED:
1.
that the Notice of Violation to Gary L. Robison, dated February 15, 2007,
is AFFIRMED;
2.
that Gary L Robison cease from violating the Logan Municipal Code §
17.13.060 and to take any necessary corrective action by May 4, 2007.
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3.
that a penalty of $5P n per J -i- - i ! 1 ...:. i __, _jiy after i.L., 4, <,::, :
until the property is brought into compliance with the Logan Municipal /Land
Development Code, with a maximum accrual of $1000.00.
4.
that the responsible person allow agents of Logan City to enter the
premises with reasonable notice for inspection to ensure compliance beginning May 4,
2007, and for one year after the date of compliance.
5.
that the responsible persons request that the case be transferred to the
Board of Adjustment is DENIED based on record of Board of Adjustments dated January
14,2003.

.DATED t h i s ^ / / £ day of

2007.

PAUL LARSEN
HEARING.OFFICER
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Zane S. Froerer Law Office
Attorney at Law
2610 Washington Blvd.

p«n r

Ogden, Utah 84401

(H I

i^fl

)PY

Telephone: 801-389-1533
Email: zmfroerer6zihotmail.com

February 22, 2007

CITY OF LOGAN
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
255 NORTH MAIN
LOGAN, UTAH 84321

Re:

Case No.: CE 06-09
Property: 910 North 1200 East
Client: Gar} Robison
Subject: Request for hearing on Notice of Violation

VIA U.S. MAIL
To Whom It May Concern:
Gary Robison
2772 Willowbend Dr.
Sandy, UT 84093
Telephone: 801-560-6588
I have been retained by Mr. Robison to represent him in the above mentioned matter. On
his behalf he herein requests a hearing on the Notice of Violation served upon his
property on February i 5, 2007. Please direct ail further correspondence to my office.

Sincerely,
LAW OFFICE

^—£>

Zane S. Frp^rer
Attorney ^
ZSF
(Robison: City of Logan vs. Robison.Ltr.Request for hearing.02-22-07
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Page 1 of 1 Digitized by the Howard
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH
AMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT ORDER

CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT

Case No

Enforcement Authority,

08-77

v.
HEARING EXAMINER: PAUL LARSEN
KARL H SEETHALER , Responsible Person
Location of Violation: 590 CANYON RD
Violation(s):
City of Logan, Land Development Code;
17.15.010 Site Development Standards,
Residential Districts
17.46.030 Permit Required before
Proceeding

Tax ID:

06-075-0006

FINDINGS
On April 07, 2008 a complaint was filed with the Department of Community Development,
Neighborhood Improvement Program, regarding the property at 590 CANYON RD, Logan.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law adopts the Jeff Hansen Survey dated July 15, 2002
as accurately delineating the true boundary line between the properties in question; this based
on Judge Low's ruling in Judgment and Decree, Civil #030100618, item #5.
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Report Summary
Page 2 of 2

The shed in question measures 148 square feet, with a height measuring eleven to twelve feet
two inches. It is within the required eight foot side and ten foot rear setback requirement for
residential zoning. The shed continues to affect the use of the adjacent property and requires
corrective action.
A Notice of Violation was served on July 21, 2009 to KARL H SEETHALER for a violation on
real property located KARL H SEETHALER. On July 31, 2009, KARL H SEETHALER appealed
the Notice of Violation to the Department of Community Development and the Administrative
Enforcement Hearing was scheduled.
ORDER
Pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Section(s):
§17.15.010 Site Development Standards, Residential Districts
§17.46.030 Permit Required before Proceeding
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. that the Notice of Violation to KARL H SEETHALER, dated July 21, 2009, is AFFIRMED;
2. that KARL H SEETHALER cease from violating the Logan Municipal Code(s): and to
take any necessary corrective action in relocating the structure outside the required
setbacks with permit or remove it from the property by amended date of November 25,
2009 to correct the above mentioned violation(s); setback requirements are rioted in the
City of Logan Land Development Code's residential site development standard table.
3. that the penalty of $50.00 per day per violation will incur every day after the Amended
date of November 25, 2009 , until the property is brought into compliance with the Logan
Municipal / Land Development Code, with the maximum accrual of $1,000.00 per
violation.
4. that the responsible person(s) allow agents of Logan City to enter upon the property to
inspect the shed exterior or reconstruction of such with reasonable notice to ensure
compliance beginning on Amended date of November 25, 2009.

Dated this /f^Day

of October 09

/....
/
,
/ r
V "%+> ^
A -.- ' T^ftr^SPfr
l /
Paul Larsen
Hearing Examiner
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OLSON& HOGGAN, PC.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

L BRENT HOCCAN
BRUCE 1. IORCENSEN
JAMES C JENKINS
MARLINJ GRANT

AUG-4/01^

ROBERT B FUNK-

)UTH MAIN, SUITE 200
PO BOX 525
N, UTAH 8422ii0_525
TELEPHONE
{4l£j52^\55T^
TOLL FREE (866) 752-1^51
TELEFAX (4 35) 752-2295

OGAK

MILES P JENSEN

KEVIN J FIFE*
JEFFERY B. ADAIR"

TREMONTON OFFICE
123 EAST MAIN
P.O.BOX 1 15
REKfeNTON, UTAH 84 3 37-0II5
'HONE (435) 257-3885
TELEFAX (435) 257-0365

j»iy 3i, 2009 ATTORNEY'S 0 F F I 6 6 :

KELLY J. SMITH
JONATHAN R. PALMER
CHARLES P OLSON (19161975)

E-MAIL oh@oh-pc.com
www.oh-pc.com

'also licensed in Idaho
"also licensed in Nevada

T orrcs-n f ^ i + V
-'—£>~^ "—\>

Attn: Lee Edwards
255 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321
Re:

REQUEST FOR HEARING - Notice of Violation
Cambridge Court Apartments - Shed Appeal - 590 Canyon Road, Logan, UT
Responsible Person: Karl H. Seethaler
785 E 600 S
River Heights, UT 84321
Our FileNo.N~3731.3
Case No. CE 08-77

Dear Lee:
I represent Karl Seethaler in the above referenced matter. Pursuant to the Notice of Violation
received by the onsite managers of Cambridge Court Apartments, I hereby request a hearing in this
matter. Please contact me, so that a hearing may be scheduled regarding this matter. I would also
like to discuss the case with you before we proceed further Thanks.

Sincerely yours,
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

Miles P. Jensen
MPJ/ajd
Enclosures
J:\MPJ\Ltr\ledwards.doc
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
MIKE NIELSEN ORDER

CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT

08-280

Case No

Enforcement Authority,

HEARING EXAMINER: PAUL LARSEN
MIKE NIELSEN , Responsible Person
Location of Violation:
1947 N MAIN ST
Violation(s):
8-Temp. Signs/Banners
Tax ID:
04-080-0042

FINDINGS
On October 13, 2008 Code Inspector, John Lisonbee, Department of Community Development,
Neighborhood Improvement Division, cited Mike Nielsen regarding signage on the property at
1947 N MAIN ST, Logan. The violation involved two banners posted between poles at Ensign
Toyota/Honda. Contact was made with the Manager, Mike Nielsen, who acknowledged himself
as the responsible person for the signage in question. He was issued administrative citation
#2125, for two counts of 17.40.100, Temporary signs, Banners.

ORDER
Pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Section(s), §17.40.100, Temporary signs, Banners; IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED:
1. that the Administrative Citation #2125 to MIKE NIELSEN, dated October 13, 2008, is
AFFIRMED;
2. that the penalty of $50.00 be assessed, due and payable
s ^
Dated this 1 ^

Day of December 08
arsen
Hearing Examiner
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By Jackson B, Howard

one time, it was the concept that a
awyer did most everything that was
id of a lawyer, and specialties were
iie exception than the rule. Now, it is
nsensus that the practice of law respecialization and specialty practice
e, in my opinion, the rule than the
ion. When I began the practice, law
in Utah were small, and if my recon serves me, the largest law firm in
n 1949 was approximately six mem*Ye now have many firms in Utah with
than 50 lawyers and a few in the
borhood of 100 lawyers. This has
;ed greatly the character and perty of the lawyer.
J nature of the practice has increased
Dmplications, and nearly every case
equires extensive discovery and prepn. Even non-litigation cases require
sive briefing and memorandums. Files
vould earlier have been a few pages
ire two or three folders and the cost of
individual transaction or each indiil case has increased exponentially.
m not sure that all of this change has
for the good. In fact, a healthy argueould be made that the quality of the
ice is not better now than it was 40
> ago, and certainly a wholesome argu• could be made that the quality of the
er is not as good now as it was then. In
c- - n

closure, we have a good many more litiqualities required of a true advocate.
gators than lawyers, and the objective now
We have further, as lawyers, been comis to exhaustively prepare a case for trial, promised by industry organizational coneven to the extent that trial becomes eco- cepts and the microchip mentality, to the
nomically impossible. Cases that should be detriment of the lawyer as the well-rounded
tried in a week now take a month to try. We scholar conversant with science and the
deal in a host of side issues rather than
humanities, and knowledgeable in history
getting to the heart of the problem. Insur- and philosophy. We are reducing ourselves
ance companies and large corporate litigants
to technicians and are overwhelmed with the
have embarked upon the technique of econeed to accumulate technical operating
nomic defenses, making the prosecution of
data. Because of the vast quantity of infora case financially impossible for most liti- mation we need to understand from recent
gants. Injuries of minor value, regardless of
case decisions to computer novations, many
how just and deserving, cannot be addressed
of us are simply sinking in the swamp of
because of the cost involved.
data overload,
Supposed simplifications have themWhile tangential to my basic theme, I
selves increased the complications of litihave concluded that far too many graduates
gation. For example, we now write a
of the law schools are not truly qualified to
five-page digest for a 1.0-page brief (Rule
be lawyers. I am also of the opinion that the
4-501(1) of the Utah Rules of Jud. Admin.)
practice of law is a great disappointment to a
and instead of knowing the basics of pleadsizeable portion of our membership. It
ing as required in the days of code pleadseems many come to the practice with exings, we now are confronted with rules of
pectations that cannot be obtained. All too
procedure, rules of evidence, and appellate
often they don't discover the lack of potenrules for each of the courts, and so, the
tial or their disenchantment until too many
practice of law has frequently been reduced
years have been invested, and the opporto rule interpreting, vis-a-vis, issue resoltunities to change have been irretrievably
ving. This is not to say that it is all bad, but it
lost.
does point out that it is questionable whether
It is my feeling that many of the younger
we have improved the manner in which law
lawyers who have come into the profession
is practiced, whether we have elevated the
in the last five years should take a strong and
quality of practice, and. whether we have
critical
look at the profession to see if it is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
j : , ,
^ n n i ^ o t ^Machine-generated
thp fundamental
lawyer-like
suited
for
them and their objectives. Many
OCR, may contain errors.

of our members would be better off doing a
number of other things that would bring to
them a personal satisfaction that they will
never receive from the practice of law.
Lawyers who are not excited about what
they are doing at 5:00 p.m. on a Friday
afternoon are perhaps not suited to the practice.
Life is too short to engage in a profession
that doesn't bring the personal satisfaction,
joys and rewards that the individual requires, and to practice law simply because it
is a profession which gives one standing in
the community or minimal other reasons is a
mistake, for to do so undermines the character of the individual, precursors failure and
has a host of deleterious effects to the person, the spouse and the family.
The truth of these observations is fully
reflected in the disciplinary proceedings before the Bar. More concerning, however,
are those situations that don't make it to the
discipline level, and are reflected in mediocrity in the performance of professional
responsibilities.
It is my belief that a lawyer should think
of himself as the "best lawyer in the world/'
and the standard of practice should be
gauged by the concept that if any other
lawyer could do it better, then it's the duty
of the lawyer not to take the case or not to

undertake the transaction, but to refer it to
someone else who is better suited, more
capable, and more devoted to the undertaking. While this may sound like an unreachable hyperbole, what I really mean is
that before the lawyer takes the assignment
he may not have all the knowledge and skill
required, but if he takes the case it is incumbent for him to overcome his deficiencies by
diligent preparation.
If the practice of law is not a happy home,
1 would recommend to those who have the
youth and the will, and are not happy in the
practice, to think seriously of another occupation, and to take steps to secure that
change. I know of a number of lawyers who
have made that decision and who are gratified and pleased that they have done so. The
testimonies of those people to the happiness
such change has brought to them is pleasing
to me and I believe that, ultimately, it constitutes a service to the public. 1 am confident that neither the individual lawyer nor
the public is well, served by the lawyer
whose heart is not in the practice. I further
believe that many of the illnesses that afflict
the Bar, such as those that I. have mentioned
above, are in many ways the result of law
school graduates who become practitioners,
but not lawyers,
It is impossible to write a succinct con-

clusion to these rambling observations,
though it would be adequate to say that for
one to get more out of the profession he must
become more of a lawyer and less of a
technician. Courts and legislators must find
a way to make litigation a reasonable procedure for the average citizen, and those
who are not exhilarated by practicing law
should quickly and courageously seek another calling.
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14.30.050.
14.30.060.
14.30.070.
14.30.080.
14.30.090.

Figure 14.29.150(a). Wall Signs and Painted Wall Signs in the
PIC Zone.
Figure 14.29.150(b). Freestanding Signs up to 5 Feet High in the
Figure 14.29.150(c) Freestanding signs or#r 5 Feet High in the PIC Zone.
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Chapter 14.30, S - Supplementary Residential
Overlay Zone.
14.30.010.
14.30.020.
14.30.030.
14.30.040.

14.30.010. Purpose and Objectives.
The purpose of the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay
Zone is to recognize the unique character of Provo City as a
"university community" and to accommodate supplementary living
accommodations in some appropriate one-family residential areas of
the community. These provisions are intended to meet community
demands for residential accommodations for semitransient residents in
areas of the community adjacent to major educational and institutional
uses. This overlay zone is designed to provide an alternative living
environment for said semi-transient residents to that normally found
within the higher density multiple residential zones. The (S) overlay
zone will therefore protect and enhance the desirable aesthetic
characteristics of the underlying one-family residential zone. An Rl
zone with a Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay as described in
this Chapter is intended to continue the very low density of an Rl
zone. The sole function of the overlay is to permit alternate methods
of housing the occupancy otherwise permitted in an Rl zone.
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Area of Zone.
Petition for Zone Adoption.
Parking Requirements.
Nonconforming Uses.
Termination of Nonconforming Uses - Recovery
of Investment.

Purpose and Objectives.
Use in Combination.
Permitted Uses.
Development Standards.

14.30.020. Use in Combination.
(1) The Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone may be
used only in combination with the Rl (One-family Residential) Zone
as designated herein. The provisions of the (S) Overlay Zone shall
become supplementary to the provisions of the zone with which it is
combined. The (S) Overlay Zone shall not be applied lo any land area
as an independent zone.
14.30.030. Permitted Uses.
Uses permitted in the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay
Zone shall be limited to those uses listed as permitted uses in an Rl
zone with the following additional permitted uses:
(1) Accessory Apartment: For purposes of the Supplementary
Residential Overlay Zone, a structure which is in all respects by design,
construction, and appearance a one-family dwelling, qualifying as
such within an Rl zone, may include an accessory apartment if the
accessory apartment:
(a) is located in a basement or in a second level above
ground-level and there is a useable interior connection between
the accessory apartment and the principal part of the dwelling
unit; and,
(b) does not alter the appearance of the structure as a onefamily dwelling, and does not cause the dwelling unit within
which the accessory apartment is located to resemble in any
degree a side-by-side, side-to-back, back-to-back, or other type
of two-family dwelling; and
(c) is a one-family dwelling having an accessor)' apartment
under the provisions of this section shall have no more than two
(2) kitchens within the dwelling.
() Occupancy:
(a) A one-family dwelling with an accessory apartment,
which is authorized by and conforms to the requirements set
forth in this section, shall be occupied, either in the accessory
apartment or in the principal part of the dwelling unit, by
(i) one (1) person living alone; or
(ii) the head of household and all persons related to
the head of household by marriage or adoption as a parent,
child, grandparent, grandchild, brother, sister, uncle, aunt,
nephew, niece, great-grandparent or great-grandchild. Two
(2) or more of these persons shall share the legal relationship
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of husband and wife, or parent and child or grandparent and child. Such parent or grandparent shall actually reside in
the subject dwelling and the dwelling shall be the principal
residence of any such person.
(b) That part of the dwelling unit which is not occupied by
the persons described in Subsection (2)(a) may be occupied by
not more than four (4) related or unrelated persons.
(c) Either the principal part of the dwelling unit or the
accessory apartment shall be occupied by the owner of the
dwelling. After owner occupancy has been duly established,
such occupancy shall not be required when:
(i) the owner has a bona fide, temporary absence of
three (3) years or less for activities such as temporary job
assignments, active military duty, sabbaticals, or voluntary
service (indefinite periods of absence from the dwelling
shall not qualify for this exception), or
(ii) the owner is placed in a hospital, nursing home,
assisted living facility or other similar facility.
(iii) Owner occupancy shall have the meaning set
forth in Section 14.06.020 of this Title. (Am 1998-55, Am
2000-15, Am 2009-17, Am 2010-28)
14.30.040. Development Standards.
All development standards required in the Supplementary
Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be the same as those required
by the provisions of the underlying zone with which the (S) zone is
combined.
14.30.050. Area of Zone.
The Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be applied
to a land area ten (10) acres or more which contains at least forty (40)
existing dwelling structures, and which is at least fifty percent (50%)
developed. The land area shall be free from islands or peninsulas or
any other unreasonable boundary line configurations. Additions to an
existing (S) Overlay Zone shall be by petition which conforms to all
provisions of this Chapter except acreage, and number of dwellings.
(Am 1991-07)
!
14.30.060. Petition for Zone Adoption.
Rep 2007-32
14.30.070. Parking Requirements.
Parking requirements for the Supplementary Residential (S)
Overlay Zone shall be as required by the provisions of Section
14.37.090, Provo City Code, except that any single dwelling with an
occupied accessory dwelling shall have at least two (2) additional offstreet parking spaces, for a total of four (4) spaces. In no case shall
the number of off-street parking spaces be less than the number of
vehicles being maintained on the premises. If the owner wishes to rent
to more unrelated individuals than there are supplementary parking
spaces, this shall only be allowed under the following conditions:
(1) Owners shall take the initiative in enforcing compliance
by tenants with the limitations imposed herein upon the number of
vehicles allowed their tenants and if a tenant fails to comply with such
limitations after appropriate notice, owners shall forthwith evict such
tenant;
(2) Owners shall maintain a list of all tenants, together with the
make and license plate number of their respective vehicles, which
owners shall provide to Provo City upon request;
(3) Owners shall enter into a covenant with Provo City that they
will not rent to tenants having a total number of vehicles in excess of
the total number of supplementary parking spaces (over and above the
two (2) spaces required for the resident family) provided by owners,
without the prior written consent of Provo City, which covenant shall

be binding on all subsequent owners of the subject apartments. (Am
1990-31)
14.30.080. Nonconforming Uses.
(1) After April 4, 2000, except as provided in subparagraph (2)
of this Section, every dwelling unit in the (S) Overlay zone shall
conform to the requirements of this Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter 14.36 of this Title,
a one-family dwelling with an accessory dwelling unit which on April
4, 2000 is not owner occupied and which was legally established
shall not be required to conform to the owner occupancy and other
development standards of this Chapter until April 4,2003. An owner
of property affected by this Subsection may apply for an extension
of time to comply with such occupancy and development standards
subject to the provisions of Section 14.30.090 of this Chapter. (Am
2000-15)
14.30.090. Termination of Nonconforming Uses - Recovery of
Investment.
(1) The Community Development Director or his designee shall
grant an owner of property affected by Subsection 14.30.080(2) of
this Chapter an extension of the time required to conform with such
Section if:
(a) the owner:
(i) by August 4, 2000 files a notice of intent to appjy
for a time extension as provided in this Section; and
(ii) by April 4, 2001 files a complete application for an
extension of time as provided in this Section.
(b) the owner's application for an extension of time
demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the nonconforming use which is the subject of the
application was legally established; and
(ii) subject to the formula in Subsection (2) of this
Section, the owner is unable to recover prior to April 4,
2003 the amount of the owner's investment in the property.
(2) (a) The time period during which an owner may recover
the amount of his investment in property affected by Section
14.30.080(2) of this Chapter shall be determined by dividing the
residual value of the property by the average monthly net rental
income from the property. The resulting figure is the number of
months which the owner shall have to recover his investment in
the property.
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection the following
definitions shall apply:
"Amount of the owner's investment" means the adjusted
present value of a property as of April 4, 2000.
"Adjusted present value" means a property's original
purchase price plus any capital improvements and less
depreciation and net income from the property, all as adjusted
for inflation to April 4, 2000.
"Compliance value" means the appraised value of
the property on April 4, 2000 based on compliance with the
requirements of this Chapter.
"Residual value" means the difference between a
property's adjusted present value and its compliance value as of
April 4, 2000.
(c)The time period determined under Subsection (a) of this
Section shall apply to the property for which the owner made an
application for extension and to the owner's successors, if any,
until such time period has run.
(3) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Community
Development Director or his designee applying this Section may
appeal such decision to the Board of Adjustment as provided in
Chapter 14.05 of this Title.
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6.25.060. Disclosure to be Made in Good Faith.
Each disclosure required by this Chapter and each act which
may be performed in making the disclosure shall be done in good
faith. For purposes of this Chapter, "good faith" means honesty in fact
in the conduct of the transaction. (Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36)
6.25.070. Waiver of Buyer's or Lessee's Right to Disclosure.
The disclosures required under this Chapter may not be waived
and any attempted waiver shall be void as against public policy.
(Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36)
6.25.080. Failure to Disclose-Damages.
A buyer or lessee to whom zoning disclosure is not made as
required by this Chapter and who closes a transaction included within
the scope of Section 6.25.030(1) may bring a civil action for damages
caused as a result thereof. (Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36)
6.25.090. Limitation on Liability.
(1) A statement made on a zoning disclosure or a zoning
disclosure form does not constitute a warranty by the seller or lessor
as to any condition of the property about which the seller or lessor has
no actual knowledge.
(2) A seller or lessor is not liable for any error, inaccuracy, or
omission in a zoning disclosure or zoning disclosure form provided
under this Chapter if the error, inaccuracy, or omission was based
upon information that was:
(a) not within the actual knowledge of the seller or lessor;
or
(b) provided by Provo City or another government entity.
(3) Each zoning disclosure or zoning disclosure form is provided
to sellers, buyers, lessors and lessees of property for the purposes set
forth in Section 6.25.010 of this Chapter. Although a zoning disclosure
form may be provided by Provo City, the buyer or lessee of property
subject to the requirements of this Chapter is solely responsible for
ascertaining conditions and circumstances applicable to the property.
The City's officers and employees shall not be liable for any error,
inaccuracy, or omission in a zoning disclosure form. (Enacted 2000-29,
Am 2000-36)
6.25.100. Duty of Agent.
(1) Any person representing a seller or lessor of residential
property has a duty to inform the seller or lessor of the obligation to
disclose the zoning information as required by this Chapter.
(2) A person who represents a seller or lessor of residential
property as set forth in paragraph (1) of this Section and who performs
the duties specified therein shall:
(a) have no further duties under this Chapter; and
(b) not be liable for a violation of the requirements of
this Chapter by a seller or lessor of property subject to such
requirements. (Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36)
6.25.110. Enforcement.
(1) The provisions of this Chapter may be enforced by
administrative action pursuant to the provisions of Title 17, Provo
City Code.
(2) A civil action for damages or to abate or enjoin a violation
of this Chapter may be brought by Provo City or by any aggrieved
person. The prevailing party in a civil action shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorneys fees.
(3) The remedies provided for in this section shall be cumulative
and not exclusive. (Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36)

6.26.010.
6.26.020.
6.26.030.
6.26.040.
6.26.050.
6.26.060.
6.26.070.
6.26.080.
6.26.090.
6.26.100.
6.26.110.
6.26.120.
6.26.130.

Definitions.
License Required.
License Application.
License Procedure.
License Fee.
Effect of License Issuance.
License Denial.
License Suspension or Revocation.
Determination of Legal Status.
Minimum Health and Safety Requirements.
Minimum Parking Requirements.
inspections.
Effective Date.

6.26.010. Definitions.
Words and phrases contained herein which are defined in
Chapters 6.01 or 6.02 of this Title, or Chapter 14.06 of Title 14, as
amended, shall have the meanings set forth in such chapters. (Enacted
2003-01)
6.26.020. License Required.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to keep, conduct, operate or
maintain a rental dwelling or a short-term rental dwelling within the
City without a business license for such dwelling. A person who owns
multiple-rental dwellings or multiple buildings containing rental
dwellings is not required to obtain more than one (1) business license
for the operation and maintenance of those rental dwellings.
(2) It is unlawful to maintain a short-term rental dwelling in any
agricultural or residential zone. A short-term rental dwelling which is
leased or rented more than one (i) time in any thirty (30) day period
shall be prima facie evidence that the use of the building is a shortterm rental dwelling.
(3) A business license for a rental dwelling or a short-term
rental dwelling is not transferable between persons or structures. Any
person holding such license shall give written notice within thirty
(30) days to the business license official after having transferred or
otherwise disposed of legal or equitable control of any rental dwelling
licensed under this Chapter. Such notice of transferred interest shall
be deemed a request to cancel an existing business license for such
rental dwelling and shall include the name, address, and information
regarding the person(s) succeeding to the ownership or control
thereof. The new owner shall obtain a business license as required by
this Chapter.
(4) A business license shall not be required for a dwelling
unit which is ordinarily owner-occupied but is temporarily rented
because:
(a) the owner is placed in a hospital, nursing home, assisted
living facility or other similar facility, or
(b) the owner has a bona fide, temporary absence of three
(3) years or less for activities such as temporary job assignments,
sabbaticals, or voluntary service. Indefinite periods of absence
from the dwelling shall not qualify for this exception.
(c) As used in this subsection owner occupancy means:
(i) a natural person who possesses fifty (50) percent
ownership or more in the dwelling and said dwelling is the
primary residence of such person; or
(ii) a family trust created for the primary purpose of
estate planning by one (I) or more trustors who create the
trust, place the dwelling in such trust, and whose primary
residence is such dwelling. (Enacted 2003-01, Am 2006-14,
Am 2008-17)

6.26.030.
License
Application.
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An application for a business license shall conform to the
requirements of Section 6.01.060 of this Title and shall include the
following additional information:
(1) the address of each building containing rental dwellings
which are owned, operated or maintained by the applicant;
(2) the number of rental dwelling units in each building;
(3) the occupancy status ofeaeh rental dwelling unit;
(4) the number of parking spaces provided on the premises;
(5) if the owner of the rental dwellings is not a Utah resident,
the name, address, and both home and business telephone numbers of
a legal representative and agent who resides in the Stale of Utah for
service of process;
(6) the name, address, and both home and business telephone
numbers of a local agent who:
(a) resides not more than twenty (20) miles from the rental
dwelling(s), and
(b) is authorized to manage the rental dwelling(s):
(7) proof of liability insurance for the rental dwellings to be
licensed; and
(8) the signature of the owner of the rental dwelling(s):
(a) certifying, to the best of the owner's knowledge or belief,
that the use and occupancy of the rental dwelling(s) conforms to
applicable ordinances, and
(b) agreeing to comply with applicable ordinances. (Enacted
2003-01, Am 2006-45)
6.26.040 License Procedure.
(1) A rental dwelling business license shall be issued pursuant
to the requirements of Chapters 6.01 and 6.02 of this Title except as
modiiied by this Chapter.
(2) No business license shall be issued or renewed for a rental
dwelling unless the owner:
(a) if not a Utah resident, designates in writing a power of
attorney, in the name of a resident agent, for:
(i) receipt of service for notice of violation of the
provisions of this Chapter or any other applicable code
requirement, and
(ii) service of process, acknowledged by such agent;
(b) certifies, to the best of the owner's knowledge or belief,
that the use and occupancy of the rental dwelling(s) conforms to
applicable ordinances; and
(c) agrees to comply with applicable ordinances. (Enacted
2003-01, Am 2006-45)

An application for a rental dwelling business license may be
denied for any of the following reasons:
(l)The applicant does not meet the qualifications for a license as
provided in this Title.
(2) For a new application, nonpayment and return of a check for
the required license fee. For a renewal application, nonpayment of the
required license fee plus any penalty assessed for late payment.
(3) A reviewing City department recommends disapproval of
the application pursuant to an applicable provision of the Provo City
Code.
(4) An application contains false or incomplete information.
(5) The rental dwelling does not comply with applicable Health
Department regulations governing the premises, or any City, State or
federal law. (Enacted 2003-01)
6.26.080. License Suspension or Revocation.
The City may suspend or revoke a rental dwelling business
license for any of the reasons set forth in Section 6.01.160 of this
Title and for any of the following reasons:
(1) the licensee does not meet the qualifications for a license as
provided under this Title:
(2) the licensee gave false or incomplete information on the
licensee's application;
(3) the licensee has allowed the licensed premises to be occupied
or operated in a manner contrary to the conditions set forth in the
license; or
(4) the licensee's agents or employees have violated the
provisions of the license, this Title or any other law while acting as an
agent or employee of the licensee. (Enacted 2003-01)

6.26.090. Determination of Legal Status.
(1) The provisions of this subsection shall be applied to determine
whether a particular rental dwelling was legally established and is
thus qualified, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, for a rental
dwelling business license.
(2) If necessary building and zoning permits were issued
authorizing the establishment of a rental dwelling, construction was
substantially completed pursuant to such permits, and no deviation
therefrom has occurred thereafter, the issuance of such permits shall be
prima facie evidence that the rental dwelling was legally established.
A business license for such rental dwelling may be issued, subject to
the provisions of this Chapter.
(3) If necessary building permits were not issued authorizing
a rental dwelling, or if allegations are made that necessary permits
6.26.050. License Fee.
were issued, but no record of any such permits can be found, a
(1) The fee for a rental dwelling business license shall be as on
determination of the legal status of the rental dwelling shall be made
the Consolidated Fee Schedule adopted by the Municipal Council.
pursuant to subsections (a), (b), and (c) below.
(a) A determination shall be made as to whether the rental
(2) There shall be no fee reduction for the first year in which a
dwelling substantially conforms to applicable zoning and
person engages in the business of operating, keeping, conducting, or
building code requirements in effect when the rental dwelling was
maintaining a rental dwelling.
established. If necessary to make such determination, the Zoning
(3) The business license fee shall be paid in advance for one (1)
Administrator, Chief Building Official or their designees may
year and shall be due and payable on August 1 ofeaeh year. A license
inspect the rental dwelling premises, pursuant to authorization
shall be delinquent if not paid before August 31 of the year for which
from the owner of the rental dwelling.
it is due. (Enacted 2003-01, Am 2003-36, Am 2006-15, Am 2006-45)
(i) If the rental dwelling conforms to requirements
of the currently applicable zone, as set forth in Title 14,
6.26.060. Effect of License Issuance.
Provo City Code, then the rental dwelling shall be deemed
The issuance of a rental dwelling business license shall not have
legally established so long as substantial evidence exists to
the effect of changing the legal status of a rental dwelling, including,
conclude the rental dwelling met building code standards in
but not limited to:
effect when the dwelling unit was created and no deviations
(1) legalizing an illegally created dwelling unit, use, or other
therefrom have occurred, other than deviations required by
circumstance, or
applicable law.
(2) recognizing a nonconforming use. structure, or other
the BYU.
rental dwelling does not conform to
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(i) a greater number of dwelling units is permitted
the rental dwelling was created, then the rental dwelling
by the zone where the dwelling is located,
shall be deemed illegal and no rental dwelling business
(ii) a building permit has been issued authorizing
license shall be issued.
the dwelling units, and
(iii) If the rental dwelling substantially conforms
(iii) applicable provisions of this Title are met.
to zoning and building code requirements that applied
when the rental dwelling was created, or conforms to
(Enacted 2003-01, Am 2003-36, Am 2007-29)
requirements of a zoning status determination which may
have been previously made by the City, and no deviations
6.26.100. Minimum Health and Safety Requirements.
therefrom have occurred, other than deviations required by
After the effective date of this Chapter, and notwithstanding
applicable law. then the rental dwelling shall be deemed
that a rental dwelling qualifies for a business license under Section
legally established.
6.26.090 of this Chapter, each rental dwelling shall meet the building
code requirements necessary to achieve, or be mitigated to the
(iv) If the rental dwelling does not substantially conform
satisfaction of the Chief Building Official to achieve:
to zoning and building code requirements that applied
when the rental dwelling was created, a rental dwelling
(1) structural integrity;
business license may be issued if the illegal aspects of the
(2) proper installation, maintenance and operational condition of
structure are abated, mitigated, or brought into compliance
all plumbing, electrical, and mechanical systems;
with applicable zoning and building code requirements in
(3) appropriate exiting;
effect when the rental dwelling was established, except as
(4) properly constructed and located stairways, including
otherwise provided in Section 6.26.100 of this Chapter;
consistent rise and run of stair treads;
and provided the dwelling units in the rental dwelling have
(5) appropriate bedroom egress windows, including proper sill
regularly been occupied in a manner that would have been
height and size of window openings and vvindow wells for basement
allowed when the rental dwelling was established. The
rooms;
fact that a particular number of dwelling units could have
(6) minimum bedroom floor area;
been established under prior applicable zoning shall not be
(7) adequate guardrails;
used as a basis for authorizing a greater number of dwelling
(8) proper backflow prevention devices;
units than the number of units which have been regularly
(9) appropriately located and operational smoke alarms;
occupied as such in a rental dwelling.
(10) watertight and sound roofing systems;
(11) fire-rated separation between dwelling units: and
(b) The presence of an interior connection between upper,
(12) properly placed street addressing. (Enacted 2003-0L Am 2003lower, or adjoining portions of a structure originally constructed
as a single family dwelling shall create a presumption that only
one (I) dwelling unit was originally authorized, unless the
connection was obviously originally constructed as a vestibule,
6.26.110. Minimum Parking Requirements.
lobby, or passage way between dwelling units in the structure.
After the effective date of this Section, parking for a rental
Such presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of
dwelling shall conform to the following parking requirements:
evidence that the rental dwelling was legally established.
(1) Parking and driveway areas for a rental dwelling shall be
paved entirely with asphaltic cement or concrete and maintained in
(c) Rental dwellings located within a complex consisting of
one (I) or more multiple-family dwellings or apartment buildings
good condition.
constructed prior to January l, 1974, and located in a zone where
(a) Paving shall be maintained so as to eliminate dust or
such dwellings and buildings, as presently existing, are not
mud, and shall be sealed, resurfaced, graded and drained to
permitted under Title 14, Provo City Code, shall be entitled to a
dispose of all surface water. Surface water drainage shall not
rental dwelling business license so long as the requirements of
cross a public sidewalk.
this Chapter are met, and such dwellings and apartments in the
(b) The width of an nonconforming driveway existing prior
complex:
to August 17, 2004 may continue subject to the standards in
(i) were originally constructed substantially as
effect when the driveway was created. In no case, however, shall
presently existing;
the paved width of a driveway be less than eight and one-half
(ii) were not originally constructed and occupied
(8/2) feet.
as single-family dwellings and later converted to
(c) The requirements of this Subsection (I) shall not apply
multiple- family or apartment dwellings, except as
to a detached one-family rental dwelling. Provided, however,
permitted by a building permit;
that any legally existing on-site parking for such a dwelling shall
(iii) are all owned by the same individual,
be maintained in good condition.
association, firm, partnership, or other legal entity;
(2) The size of each parking space shall be:
and
(a) eight and one-half (8/4) feet by eighteen (18) feet, or
(iv) are managed by a property manager, or
(b) if smaller than eight and one-half (8/2) feet by eighteen
management company in Provo City.
(18) feet, the size required when the parking space was created.
(4) (a) A person:
Provided, however, that a parking space subject to this Subsection
shall always be at least seven and one-half (7/2) feet by fifteen
(i) who owns a dwelling originally constructed as
a one-family dwelling which existed prior to August
(15) feet. *
1,2003, and
(3) Pavement thickness for a parking space shall be as follows:
(ii) who has not. applied for or obtained a rental
(a) Asphalt: minimum of two (2) inches of asphalt and six
dwelling license for such dwelling under the provisions
(6) inches of road base.
of this Chapter by December 31, 2007;
(b) Concrete: minimum of four (4) inches.
(b) shall not be entitled to thereafter obtain a rental
(4) Each rental dwelling shall have on-site parking spaces which
Digitized
Howard
W. Hunter
J. Reuben
Clarkof:
Law School, BYU.
dwelling license for more than
one by
(I)therental
dwelling
unitLaw
in Library,
equal
the greater
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
such dwelling unless:
(a) The number of parking spaces required by applicable
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(b) the number of legal parking spaces existing on August
17, 2004, or
(c) the number of parking spaces required to provide a
parking space for every motor vehicle used by occupants of the
rental dwelling. Vehicles owned or operated from such premises
shall not exceed the number of legal off-street parking spaces
required to provide a parking space for every motor vehicle used
by occupants of a rental dwelling.
(5) Parking areas containing five (5) or more spaces shall be
striped to clearly demarcate required parking spaces. Striping shall be
at least three (3) inches wide and shall consist of white or yellow paint
designed for this purpose.
(6) No off-street parking shall be permitted in a required front
yard or street side yard except as follows:
(a) Tandem parking spaces for a one-family dwelling or a
two-family dwelling may be located on a driveway in a required
front or side yard provided such driveway leads to the minimum
number of required covered off-street parking spaces which are
located behind any required front or side yard setback.
(b) Nonconforming parking that has been established for
front yard, side yard, or tandem parking not leading to covered
parking, if permitted by applicable codes in effect when the rental
dwelling was created, shall be permitted, A public sidewalk shall
not be used for any portion of a parking space.
(7) An existing carport or garage may continue to serve as
required off-street parking subject to the standards in effect when the
carport or garage was created, provided that the interior dimensions
of a garage or carport shall in no case be less than nine (9) feet wide
and fifteen (15) feet deep.
(8) Off-street parking for a rental dwelling shall be located on
the same lot as the dwelling which it is required to serve. Required
parking for multiple residential developments shall not be rented,
leased or otherwise utilized by another dwelling unit or development
with the intent of increasing the occupancy of a dwelling unit.
(9) In the case of mixed uses in a building or on a lot (commercial
and residential uses), the total requirement for off-street parking
spaces shall be the sum of the parking required for each use present in
the building or on the lot.
(10) No parking lot as required by this Section shall be constructed
or maintained or allowed within one hundred (100) feet of the closest
bank of the Provo River at any location where the adjacent property
to the river is part of the flood plain.
(11) Plans for proposed changes or additions to parking
existing as of the effective date of this Section shall be submitted
to the Community Development Department and approved prior to
paving. Such plans shall be drawn to a recognized scale indicating the
proposed parking including location, size, shape, design, curb cuts
and shall show all structures located on the property. (Enacted 2003-01,
Am 2003-36, Am 2004-21, Am 2004-32, Am 2006-14)

(i) issued and have not expired or been revoked;
(ii) applied for but not issued; and
(iii) applied for and not issued which have been
pending for more than six (6) months; and;
(b) the number of rental dwelling units authorized under all
presently valid licenses.
(2) In conjunction with the report required under Subsection
(1) of this section, the Mayor shall provide a report to the Municipal
Council which details the reasons why any license pending for more
than one (1) year has not been issued. (Enacted 2007-29)

Chapter 6.27. Ticket Scalping.
6.27.010. Unlawful Ticket Sales.
6.27.020. No Criminal Liability for Authorized Ticket Sales.
6.27.030. Criminal Liability.
6.27.010. Unlawful Ticket Sales.
It shall be unlawful for any person to resell or offer for resale
any ticket of admission or other evidence of the right of entry to any
athletic contest, concert, theater performance, amusement, exhibition,
or other entertainment event to which the general public is admitted
within seven hundred fifty (750) feet of a ticket office tor such
a contest or event, or a public entrance to such a contest or event.
(Enacted 2002-47, Ren 2003-04)
6.27.020. No Criminal Liability for Authorized Ticket Sales.
No provision of this Chapter shall criminally prohibit the
purchaser for personal use of one (1) or more tickets to an athletic
contest or entertainment event from reselling or offering for resale
any of such tickets in any zone or zones within a restricted area, when
such activity is authorized by the sponsor of the contest or event and
the owner or operator of the venue where such contest or event is
being held or to be held. (Enacted 2002-47, Ren 2003-04)
6.27.030. Criminal Liability.
Violation of this chapter shall be punishable by a minimum fine
of one hundred dollars ($100.00) for a first offense, a minimum fine
of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) for a second offense, and a
minimum fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) for a third or any
subsequent offense. (Enacted 2002-47, Ren 2003-04)

Chapter 6.28. Newsracks.

6.28.010. Title.
6.28.020. Definitions.
6.28.030. Noticing of Ordinance.
6.28.040. Newsrack Locations.
6.28.050. Yearly Permit or Certification.
6.28.060. Permit Application.
6.26.120. Inspections.
6.28.070. Permit Fee.
Inspections of rental dwellings may be conducted as provided in
6.28.080. Permit Issuance.
Section 6.01.070, Provo City Code. (Enacted 2003-01)
6.28.090. Publication Priority.
6.28.100. Certification Application.
6.26.130, Effective Date.
6.28.110. Certificate Fee.
The provisions of this Chapter shall take effect on August 1,
6.28.120. Hold Harmless.
2003, after which no rental dwelling shall be rented, loaned, leased,
6.28.130. Insurance Requirements.
6.28.140. Design Standards.
or hired out for a period of one (1) month or longer without a valid
6.28.150. Initial Installation Procedure.
business license. (Enacted 2003-01)
6.28.160. Identification.
6.28.170. Maintenance and Installation Standards.
6.26.140. Compliance Reports.
6.28.180. Location Restrictions.
(1) Within ten (10) days of the beginning of each calendar quarter
6.28.190.
of BYU.
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